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Abstract: 
In this paper we estimate a small model of the euro area to be used as a laboratory for 
evaluating the performance of alternative monetary policy strategies. We start with the 
relationship between output and inflation and investigate the fit of the nominal wage 
contracting model due to Taylor (1980)and three different versions of the relative real wage 
contracting model proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981)and estimated by Fuhrer and Moore 
(1995a) for the United States. While Fuhrer and Moore reject the nominal contracting model 
in favor of the relative contracting model which induces more inflation persistence, we find 
that both models fit euro area data reasonably well. When considering France, Germany and 
Italy separately, however, we find that the nominal contracting model fits German data better, 
while the relative contracting model does quite well in countries which transitioned out of a 
high inflation regime such as France and Italy. We close the model by estimating an aggregate 
demand relationship and investigate the consequences of the different wage contracting 
specifications for the inflation-output variability tradeoff, when interest rates are set according 
to Taylor ’s rule. 
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policy rules 1 Introduction
With the formation of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the eleven countries
that adopted the euro began to conduct a single monetary policy oriented towards union-
wide objectives.1 As prescribed by the Maastricht Treaty the primary goal of this policy
is to maintain price stability within the euro area. The operational deﬁnition of this goal
announced by the European Central Bank (ECB) is to aim for year-on-year increases in
the euro area price level below 2 percent.2 To evaluate alternative strategies for achieving
such a euro-area-wide objective, it is essential to build empirical models that can be used to
assess the area-wide impact of policy on key macroeconomic variables such as output and
inﬂation. Thus, the objective of this paper is to construct a small model of the euro area,
which may serve as a laboratory for evaluating the performance of alternative monetary
policy strategies in the vein of recent studies for the United States.3
One possible approach would be to construct separate models of the member economies
and link them to form a multi-country model of the euro area. The principal alternative is
to start by aggregating the relevant macroeconomic time series across member economies
and then estimate a model for the euro area as a whole. We pursue the latter approach,
because the objectives and instruments of Eurosystem monetary policy are deﬁned in terms
of euro area aggregates. However, we are aware of its drawbacks such as the possibility of
aggregation bias4 and the fact that the available historical data originates from the time
prior to EMU when the member economies experienced diﬀerent monetary policy regimes.
Therefore, we also estimate every speciﬁcation of the model separately for the three largest
1Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain.
2A detailed discussion of the ECB’s strategy can be found in Issing, Gaspar, Angeloni and Tristani (2001).
3The recent literature on policy rules for the U.S. economy has used a variety of models: (i) small-
scale backward-looking models such as Rudebusch and Svensson (1999); (ii) large-scale backward-looking
models such as Fair and Howrey (1996); (iii) small-scale models with rational expectations and nominal
rigidities (cf. Fuhrer and Moore (1995a, 1995b), Fuhrer (1997), and Orphanides and Wieland (1998)); (iv)
large-scale models of this type such as Taylor (1993a) and the Federal Reserve Board’s FRB/US model (cf.
Reifschneider et al. (1999)); and (v) small models with optimizing agents such as Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1999) and McCallum and Nelson (1999). Recent comparative studies
include Bryant, Hooper and Mann (1993) and Taylor (1999).
4See for example Beyer, Doornik and Hendry (2001).
1member economies, France, Germany and Italy.5 By comparing these estimates to those for
the euro area, we can assess the inﬂuence of aggregation on the choice of model speciﬁcation.
Furthermore, by comparing France and Italy, which experienced a convergence process prior
to EMU, to Germany, which enjoyed stable inﬂation, we can ﬁnd out whether the empirical
ﬁt of alternative speciﬁcations depends on the monetary regime prior to EMU.
We start with the relationship between inﬂation and output and make two assumptions
that are central to the key policy tradeoﬀ between inﬂation and output variability. We
assume that market participants form expectations in a forward-looking, rational manner
and that monetary policy has short-run real eﬀects due to the existence of overlapping
wage contracts. In particular, we explore the empirical ﬁt of the nominal wage contracting
model due to Taylor (1980) as well as three diﬀerent versions of the relative real wage
contracting model ﬁrst proposed by Buiter and Jewitt (1981) and estimated for the United
States by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a). Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) have argued that the
nominal contracting model cannot explain the degree of inﬂation persistence observed in
U.S. data. Instead they found strong support for the relative real wage contracting model,
which implies more inﬂation persistence and substantially higher output costs associated
with stabilizing inﬂation.
For the euro area, however, we ﬁnd that neither the nominal wage contracting model
nor the relative real wage contracting model can be rejected, although the empirical ﬁt of
the latter model is somewhat better. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that the best ﬁtting
version of the relative real wage contracting model is one that is theoretically more plausible
than the simpliﬁed speciﬁcation preferred by Fuhrer and Moore. While this version of
the relative wage contracting model also ﬁts Italian and French data quite well, only the
nominal contracting model has a shot at explaining German inﬂation data, which exhibits
substantially less persistence.
Our ﬁndings with European data have implications for the ongoing debate on the sources
of inﬂation persistence. A number of recent contributions to this debate have tried to show
5Together, these three economies comprise over 70% of economic activity in the euro area.
2that Calvo(1983)- or Taylor-style contracting structures are consistent with the empirical
evidence on inﬂation persistence if other sources of persistence such as backward-looking
expectations and time-varying credibility or measures of marginal cost rather than the
output gap are taken into account.6 Thus, our diverging results for Italy and Germany may
well be explained by the diﬀerences in the monetary policy regime prior to EMU rather than
by structural diﬀerences in the wage-setting process. Imperfect credibility of the central
bank’s commitment to inﬂation convergence may have been the source of higher inﬂation
persistence in Italy than in Germany, where inﬂation was rather stable and monetary policy
fairly predictable.
Section 2 proceeds to review the overlapping contracts speciﬁcations. Empirical inﬂation
and output dynamics are summarized in form of unconstrained VAR models in section 3,
while estimates of the structural contracting models are presented in section 4. In section 5
we close the model with an aggregate demand equation, a term structure relationship and
a policy rule, and discuss impulse responses and disinﬂation scenarios under the alternative
contracting speciﬁcations. Section 6 concludes.
2 Modeling inﬂation dynamics with overlapping contracts
We consider four speciﬁcations of overlapping wage contracts, the nominal wage contracting
model of Taylor (1980) and three variants of the relative real wage contracting model esti-
mated by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) for the United States. These models induce nominal
rigidities, because workers negotiate long-term contracts and compare the contract wage to
past contracts that are still in eﬀect and future contracts that will be negotiated over the life
of this contract. The distinction between nominal and relative real wage contracts concerns
the deﬁnition of the wage indices that form the basis of this comparison and should not be
confused with so-called real rigidities. In both cases the source of rigidity is nominal, that
6See for example Roberts (1997) on the role of adaptive expectations and Erceg and Levin (2001) on
the role of imperfect credibility of the policymaker’s inﬂation target in explaining U.S. inﬂation persistence.
Also, Taylor (2000) shows that the level of inﬂation inﬂuences the pricing power of ﬁrms and that inﬂation
persistence ought to be greater in a high inﬂation regime. Finally, Sbordone (2002) and Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) provide evidence that Calvo-style sticky-price models ﬁt the relationship between U.S. inﬂation and
real unit labor cost.
3Table 1: Alternative Staggered Contracts Models
(M-1) Price Level pt =
 3
i=0 fi xt−i where fi = .25 + (1.5 − i)s, s ∈ (0,1/6]
(M-2) NW xt =E t [¯ pt + γ ¯ qt]+σ x  x,t where ¯ pt =
 3
i=0 fi pt+i ,¯ qt =
 3
i=0 fi qt+i
(M-3) RW xt − Et [¯ pt]=E t
  3
i=0 fi vt+i + γ ¯ qt
 
+ σ x  x,t
where vt =
 3
i=0 fi(xt−i − Et[¯ pt−i])
(M-4) RW-C xt set as in (M-3) but vt =
 3
i=0 fi(xt−i − Et−i[¯ pt−i])
(M-5) RW-S xt set as in (M-3) but ¯ pt = pt
Notes: pt: aggregate price level; xt: nominal contract wage;  x,t: contract wage shock; qt: output gap; ¯ pt:
average price over the life of the contract; ¯ qt average output gap; vt: real contract wages in eﬀect over the
life of the contract.
is, at every point in time only a subset of nominal wage contracts are adjustable.
While the four speciﬁcations considered here emphasize wage contracting, the implica-
tions for price dynamics are essentially the same if prices are related to wages by a ﬁxed
markup. Thus, we follow Fuhrer and Moore (1995) in using price instead of wage data in
estimation and use the terms “contract price” and “contract wage” interchangeably. In all
speciﬁcations the log aggregate price index, pt, is a weighted average of current and previ-
ously negotiated contract wages, xt−i (i =0 ,1,...) which are still in eﬀect. Our benchmark
case deﬁned by equation (M-1) in Table 1 is a one-year weighted average, which implies
a maximum contract length of four quarters.7 The weights fi (i =0 ,1,2,3) on contract
wages from diﬀerent periods are assumed to be non-negative and time-invariant and to sum
to one. Rather than estimating each weight fi separately, we follow Fuhrer and Moore and
assume that they are a downward-sloping linear function of contract length that depends
on the parameter s, as deﬁned by model equation (M-1) in Table 1.
The determination of the nominal contract wage xt for the diﬀerent speciﬁcations is best
7Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) found this contract length suﬃcient to explain the degree of persistence in
U.S. inﬂation. Similarly, Taylor (1993a) estimated the nominal contracting model for all G-7 countries with
such a lag length.
4explained starting with Taylor’s nominal wage (NW) contracting model, which is deﬁned
by model equation (M-2). In this case, xt is negotiated with reference to the price level that
is expected to prevail over the life of the contract, Et[¯ pt], as well as the expected deviation
of output from its potential over this period, Et[¯ qt]. Since the price indices pt+i reﬂect
contemporaneous and preceding contract wages, (M-2) implies that wage setters look at
an average of nominal contract wages negotiated in the recent past and expected to be
negotiated in the near future when setting the current contract wage. In other words, they
take into account nominal wages that apply to overlapping contracts. If they expect demand
to exceed potential, qt+i > 0, they adjust the current contract wage upwards relative to
overlapping contracts. The sensitivity of contract wages to excess demand is measured by
the parameter γ. The contract wage shock,  x,t, which is assumed to be serially uncorrelated
with zero mean and unit variance, is scaled by the parameter σ x.
The relative real wage (RW) contracting speciﬁcation is deﬁned by equation (M-3). In
this case workers negotiating their nominal wage compare the implied real wage expected
over the life of their contract with the real wages on overlapping contracts in the recent
past and near future. For this comparison, it is helpful to deﬁne the index of real contract
wages currently in eﬀect, vt. Using this index, (M-3) implies that the expected real wage
under contracts signed in the current period is set with reference to the average real con-
tract wage index expected to prevail over the current and the next three quarters. For the
RW speciﬁcation a subtle but important question arises with respect to the timing of the
price expectations in the real contract wage indices vt+i. For example, the current nominal
contract wage xt depends on the index of real contract wages currently in eﬀect, vt, which
in turn is a function of the real contract wages from periods t − 1, t − 2a n dt − 3. One
possibility is that the relevant reference points for the determination of the current con-
tract wage are the ex-post realized real contract wages from these periods, which are now
known to wage setters. This assumption underlies equation (M-3). The alternative is that
current wage negotiations refer to the ex-ante expected real contract wages, which formed
the basis of negotiations in earlier periods. We refer to this case as the RW-C speciﬁcation
5in (M-4), because it implies that price expectations are conditioned on historically available
information.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) discussed the RW and RW-C speciﬁcation in the appendix of
their paper. Their preferred speciﬁcation for U.S. data, however, was a simpliﬁed version of
the RW model (hereafter referred to as RW-S). The simpliﬁcation concerned the deﬁnition
of the real contract wage. Instead of using the average price level expected to prevail
over the life of the contracts, they used the current price level, pt, as denoted in equation
(M-5). The index vt then no longer uses price expectations. Since the RW, RW-C and
RW-S speciﬁcations entail diﬀerent degrees of forward-looking behavior when forming price
expectations, they may have diﬀerent implications for inﬂation persistence.8
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we note that the four speciﬁcations, which are
written in terms of the price level and the nominal contract wage in Table 1, can be rewrit-
ten in terms of the quarterly inﬂation rate and the real contract wage. Thus, either price
levels or inﬂation rates can be used in estimation. The contract wages, however, are unob-
servable. We also note that the contracting speciﬁcations only pin down the steady-state
real contract wage as a function of steady-state inﬂation, which is ultimately determined
by the central bank’s inﬂation target, once we close the model.
3 Empirical inﬂation and output dynamics
Our empirical analysis of the alternative contracting speciﬁcations proceeds in two stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, we estimate an unconstrained bivariate VAR model to serve as an
empirical summary of euro area output and inﬂation dynamics. In the second stage, which
is discussed in the following section, we use the unconstrained VAR as auxiliary model in
8The equations summarized in Table 1 represent rules for contract wage and price setting that are
not explicitly derived from a framework with optimizing agents. However, they need not necessarily be
inconsistent with such a framework. More recently, Taylor-style ﬁxed-duration contracts have been analyzed
within optimizing dynamic general equilibrium models, for example by Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000).
However, their focus is on price rather than wage rigidity. Starting with a representative agent model with
monopolistically competitive ﬁrms they add the constraint that ﬁrms set prices for a ﬁxed number of periods
and do so in a staggered fashion. In particular, each period, 1/N ﬁrms are assumed to choose new prices
that are then ﬁxed for N Periods. As shown by Chari et al. the contract wage equation (NW) in Table 1
coincides with the log-linear approximation of their contract price equation in a stripped-down version of
their equilibrium model.
6estimating the structural parameters of the contracting speciﬁcations by simulation-based
indirect inference methods.
The data
The data we use in estimating the staggered contracts speciﬁcations comprise real GDP and
the GDP deﬂator for France, Germany, Italy and weighted averages for the euro area as a
whole.9 The history of the euro area aggregates is depicted in Figure 1. As shown in the
top-left panel euro area inﬂation steadily declined over the last 25 years. This downward
trend is a special feature of euro area data, which complicates the empirical investigation
of inﬂation dynamics relative to similar analyses for the United States.
The source of the downward trend in euro area inﬂation was the protracted disinﬂation
process undergone by some European economies. As shown in the bottom-left panel, inﬂa-
tion rates in France and Italy in the early 1970s were much higher than in Germany due to
the combination of oil price shocks and accommodative monetary policy. It took 10 and 15
years, respectively, for French and Italian inﬂation rates to decline to German levels. This
convergence process and the related role of the European Monetary System (EMS) have
been widely discussed in the policy literature.10 There is little doubt that it was largely due
to the growing commitment on the part of European policymakers to achieve and maintain
low inﬂation. The credibility of this commitment, however, varied over time.
In principle, a complete model of the European inﬂation process prior to EMU would
need to account for both, the long-run convergence process as well as short-run variations
around this trend. However, modeling the convergence process would require taking into
account the varying degree of credibility of exchange rate pegs, the possibility of crises
and realignments as well as learning by market participants about the long-run inﬂation
objectives of European policymakers. Such an analysis is beyond the objective of this
paper. Instead, we take a simpler approach by approximating the implicit time-varying
9The euro area data, which are averages of member country data using ﬁxed GDP weights at PPP rates,
have been obtained from the ECB area-wide model database (see Fagan et al. (2001)).
10See for example De Grauwe (1996) and Angeloni and Dedola (1999).
7Figure 1: The Inﬂation and Output Gap Data
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ﬁgures reported in OECD (1999).
inﬂation objective with a linear trend, and then estimate the contracting models using
inﬂation deviations from this trend. Similar approaches have been implemented by Gerlach
and Svensson (1999) and Cecchetti et al. (1999).11 For robustness we also consider an
exponential trend. Both trends are shown in the top left panel of Figure 1.
The wage contracting models we consider relate short-run inﬂation dynamics to the
deviation of actual output from potential. Constructing a structural estimate of potential
11Gerlach and Svensson assume that an implicit euro area inﬂation objective converges exponentially
to the Bundesbank’s “price norm” in estimating a P-star model of inﬂation dynamics for the euro area.
Cecchetti et al. construct inﬂation and output deviations from a 12-month moving average of actual values
and estimate inﬂation-output tradeoﬀs for a number of euro area economies.
8output for the euro area prior to EMU goes beyond the objective of this paper. Even
for the individual member countries this would be rather diﬃcult. A commonly used
alternative is the log-linear trend (cf. Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) and Taylor (1993a)).
The top right panel in Figure 1 compares the euro area output gap based on a log-linear
trend to the OECD’s (1999) estimate. The surprising similarity provides at least some
support for our use of output gaps based on log-linear trends in estimating the contracting
models.12 The resulting output gap estimates for France, Germany and Italy are shown in
the bottom right-hand panel.
Unconstrained VAR estimation
To summarize inﬂation and output dynamics we estimate the following unconstrained VAR,
 
πt
qt
 
= A1
 
πt−1
qt−1
 
+ A2
 
πt−2
qt−2
 
+ A3
 
πt−3
qt−3
 
+
 
uπ,t
uq,t
 
, (1)
where qt refers to the output gap and πt to inﬂation. As discussed above, we use inﬂation
deviations from trend rather than the actual inﬂation rate, except in the case of German
data. We consider both a linear and an exponential trend in inﬂation for robustness. In
estimation, we proceed by ﬁrst de-trending the data and then estimating the VAR coeﬃ-
cients. The maximum lag order of the VAR is 3 since the reduced form of the contracting
speciﬁcations discussed in section 2 corresponds to a constrained VAR of order 3 if the
maximum contract length is one year.
The error terms uπ,t and uq,t are assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero
and positive deﬁnite covariance matrix Σu. In ﬁtting this VAR to euro area data, standard
lag selection procedures based on the HQ and SC criteria suggest that a lag order of 2 would
be suﬃcient to capture the empirical inﬂation and output dynamics.13 However, we will
consider both in the structural estimation. 14
12Other alternatives include estimates based on the HP ﬁlter or unobserved components methods, which
we have examined in some sensitivity studies.
13The Ljung-Box Q(12) statistic indicates serially uncorrelated residuals with a marginal probability value
of 42.8%. Our point estimates imply that the smallest root of the characteristic equation det(I2 − A1 z −
A2 z
2)=0i s1 .2835, thereby suggesting that the inﬂation and output gaps are stationary. This conclusion
is roughly supported by the results of standard univariate Dickey-Fuller tests for the presence of unit roots.
14Coeﬃcient estimates of the VAR(2) and VAR(3) models are reported in Coenen and Wieland (2000).
9So far we have omitted interest rates from the VAR even though the real interest
rate is clearly a key determinant of aggregate demand and ultimately inﬂation. In fact,
once we close our model in section 5 we will posit that the short-term nominal interest
rate–the central bank’s main policy instrument–inﬂuences aggregate demand and inﬂation
through its eﬀect on the long-term real interest rate. Nevertheless, we leave the interest
rate out of the two-stage estimation of the overlapping contracts speciﬁcation. Rather than
being a preferred choice, this approach resulted from our inability to obtain reasonable
parameter estimates for a tri-variate VAR of the euro area. Our lack of success in this
regard, however, is not surprising given the following problems with European interest
rates. First, it is unclear what would be the appropriate historical interest rate for the euro
area. Historical GDP weighted averages of European interest rates need not have much
relation to the actual cost of capital faced by European ﬁrms. While one could imagine
using the relative weights in debt ﬁnancing in order to aggregate national interest rates,
these are not easily available. Secondly and perhaps more importantly, the varying degrees
of commitment to EMS parities throughout the 1980s and early 90s implied instabilities
in interest rate reaction functions at least for France and Italy. Thirdly, as convergence
became more likely inﬂation risk premia embodied in the interest rates of those countries
disappeared over time. Given these complications we prefer to rely on bivariate VARs in
estimating the overlapping contracts speciﬁcations.
Empirical autocorrelation functions
We also compute the autocorrelation functions implied by the unconstrained VARs and the
associated asymptotic conﬁdence bands.15 These autocorrelation functions provide a useful
indication whether the lead-lag relationship between inﬂation and output is consistent with
a short-run tradeoﬀ, that is, with a short-run Phillips curve. Furthermore, they form an ad-
ditional benchmark against which we can evaluate the ability of the alternative overlapping
Diﬀerences between the VAR(3) coeﬃcients from the linear and exponential trend speciﬁcations are quite
small, well below one standard deviation.
15For a detailed discussion of the methodology and the derivation of the asymptotic conﬁdence bands for
the estimated autocorrelation functions the reader is referred to Coenen (2000).
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Solid line with bold dots: Euro area autocorrelations.
Dash-dotted line: French autocorrelations.
Solid line: German autocorrelations.
Dashed line: Italian autocorrelations.
Dotted lines: Euro area autocorrelations plus/minus twice their estimated asymptotic standard errors.
contracts speciﬁcations to explain the dynamics of inﬂation in euro area data.16
The autocorrelation functions associated with the unconstrained VAR(3) model of the
euro area are depicted by the solid lines with bold dots in Figure 2. The ﬁrst and fourth
panel (top left and bottom right) show the autocorrelations of inﬂation and output gaps,
while the second and third panel show the lagged cross correlations. The thin dotted lines
16Such an approach has also been used by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) and by McCallum (1999), who argued
that autocovariance and autocorrelation functions are more appropriate for confronting macroeconomic
models with the data than impulse response functions because of their purely descriptive nature.
11indicate 95% conﬁdence bands. Both, inﬂation and output gaps are quite persistent with
positive, highly signiﬁcant autocorrelations out to lags of about 5 and 8 quarters. The cross
correlations in the second and third panel conﬁrm much of conventional wisdom about
inﬂation and output dynamics. For example, in the top-right panel, a high level of output
is followed by a high level of inﬂation a year later and again these cross correlations are
statistically signiﬁcant. In the bottom-left panel a high level of inﬂation is followed by a
low level of output a year later. These lead-lag interactions are indicative of the existence
of a conventional short-run tradeoﬀ between output and inﬂation. These correlations are
stylized facts which any structural model of output and inﬂation dynamics ought to be able
to explain.
The estimated autocorrelation functions of output and inﬂation in France, Germany and
Italy correspond to the dash-dotted, solid and dashed lines in Figure 2, respectively. The
autocorrelations for France (dash-dotted lines) and Italy (dotted lines) display qualitatively
similar characteristics as for the euro area as a whole, in particular regarding the persistence
in inﬂation and output variations. The cross correlations, however, are somewhat smaller.
For Germany (solid lines) the degree of persistence in inﬂation is substantially lower. A
further diﬀerence is that the correlations between current output and lagged inﬂation have
the opposite sign, albeit statistically insigniﬁcant.
4 Estimating the overlapping contracts speciﬁcations
The reduced-form representation
Of course, the overlapping contracts speciﬁcations alone do not represent a complete model
of inﬂation determination. Since the contract wage equations contain expected future output
gaps, we need to specify how the output gap is determined in order to solve for the reduced-
form representation of inﬂation and output dynamics for each contract speciﬁcation. A
full-information estimation approach would require a complete macroeconomic model to
estimate the structural supply, demand and policy parameters jointly. While our ultimate
objective is to build such a model, we take a less ambitious approach in estimating the
12contracting parameters and simply use the output gap equation from the unconstrained
VAR (the second row in (1)) as an auxiliary equation for output determination.17
Using the output equation from the unconstrained VAR together with the wage-price
block, we can solve for the reduced-form inﬂation and output dynamics under each of the
four diﬀerent contract speciﬁcations (RW, RW-C, RW-S and NW).18 For this purpose it
is convenient to rewrite the wage-price block in terms of the real contract wage (x−p)t
and the annualized quarterly inﬂation rate πt. This can be done for each of the four
overlapping contracts models that we consider. The reduced-form of these models is a
trivariate constrained VAR. While the quarterly inﬂation rate πt and the output gap qt are
observable variables, the real contract wage (x−p)t is unobservable. Given a maximum
contract length of one year this constrained VAR can be written as follows:



(x−p)t
πt
qt


 = B1



(x−p)t−1
πt−1
qt−1


 + B2



(x−p)t−2
πt−2
qt−2


 + B3



(x−p)t−3
πt−3
qt−3


 + B0  t (2)
where  t is a vector of serially uncorrelated error terms with mean zero and positive
(semi-) deﬁnite covariance matrix, which is assumed to be diagonal with its non-zero
elements normalized to unity. The coeﬃcients in the bottom row of the Bi matrices
(i =0 ,1,2,3) coincide exactly with the coeﬃcients of the output gap equation of the
unconstrained VAR, with the B0 coeﬃcients obtained by means of a Choleski decom-
position of the covariance matrix Σu. The reduced-form coeﬃcients in the upper two
rows of the Bi matrices, which are associated with the determination of the real con-
tract wage and inﬂation, are functions of the structural parameters (s,γ,σ x as deﬁned
in Table 2) as well as the coeﬃcients of the output gap equation of the unconstrained VAR.
Estimation method
We employ the indirect inference methods proposed by Smith (1993) and Gouri´ eroux, Mon-
fort and Renault (1993) and developed further in Gouri´ eroux and Monfort (1996) to estimate
17This limited-information approach follows Taylor (1993a) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a). Given the
diﬃculties in measuring the appropriate real interest rate for the euro area discussed in the preceding section,
this approach is likely to be more robust than a full-information approach.
18We employ the AIM algorithm of Anderson and Moore (1985), which uses the Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) method for solving linear rational expecations models, to compute model-consistent expectations.
13the structural parameters s, γ and σ x. Indirect inference is a simulation-based procedure
that provides a precise way of comparing a model to the data by comparing key character-
istics, which themselves are quantities that require estimation via an auxiliary model.19 In
our case, the aim of the estimation procedure is to ﬁnd values of s, γ and σ x such that the
degree of inﬂation persistence exhibited by the structural model matches the persistence in
the data as summarized by an approximating statistical model. The latter model should
ﬁt inﬂation and output dynamics reasonably well, but need not necessarily nest the struc-
tural model. A natural candidate is the unconstrained VAR of section 3. In particular, the
parameters of the inﬂation equation of the VAR constitute a convenient reference point for
the degree of inﬂation persistence to be matched by the structural model.
An advantage of the unconstrained VAR is that it does not require controversial identi-
fying assumptions. Furthermore, since the VAR parameters also determine the autocovari-
ance functions of inﬂation and output, matching those parameters is essentially equivalent
to matching the autocorrelations and cross-correlations discussed in section 3. In this sense,
indirect inference based on the estimated parameters of the unconstrained VAR model is
a robust and eﬃcient way to make use of the relevant information contained in the data.
By contrast, informal model calibration techniques, but also methods-of-moments based
estimation, typically rely on a small set of often subjectively chosen standard deviations
and autocorrelations directly inferred from the data.
Of course, one cannot directly match the parameters of the constrained VAR model (2)
with the parameters of the unconstrained VAR model (1) because the constrained model
also includes the real contract wage, which is unobservable. Instead, we ﬁrst simulate the
constrained VAR to generate “artiﬁcial” series for the real contract wage, the inﬂation
rate and the output gap for given values of the structural parameters (s,γ,σ x) and the
parameters of the output gap equation. All that is needed for simulation are three initial
19Formally, indirect inference provides a rigorous statistical foundation for data-based calibration tech-
niques, which have become increasingly popular in macroeconomic modelling in recent years. The procedure
itself including its asymptotic properties, is discussed in detail in the appendix of the working paper version
of this article (see Coenen and Wieland (2000)). There, we also provide a comparison to the maximum-
likelihood methods used by Taylor (1993a) and Fuhrer and Moore (1995a).
14values for each of these variables and a sequence of random shocks.20 In a second step,
we then ﬁt the unconstrained VAR model to the inﬂation and output gap series generated
in this manner and match the simulation-based estimates of the inﬂation equation as
closely as possible with the empirical estimates by searching over the feasible space of the
structural parameters.
Structural parameter estimates for the euro area
Euro area estimation results for the baseline version of the relative real wage contracting
model (RW), the version with price expectations conditioned on historically available in-
formation (RW-C), the simpliﬁed version preferred by Fuhrer and Moore (RW-S) and the
nominal wage contracting model (NW) are reported in Table 2. The estimation results
indicate that all four contracting models ﬁt the euro area inﬂation dynamics reasonably well
when we allow for a maximum contract length of one year and thus three lags in the VAR.
As can be seen from the standard errors given in parentheses, the estimates of the struc-
tural parameters are almost always statistically signiﬁcant with the appropriate sign and
economically signiﬁcant magnitude. Although the parameter estimates of the diﬀerent real
wage contracting speciﬁcations are not directly comparable, since the speciﬁcations involve
diﬀerent degrees of forward-lookingness, it is interesting to note that the RW-S speciﬁcation
gives more weight to the higher lags than the RW and the RW-C speciﬁcations as implied
by the smaller estimates of the slope parameter s.
We also compute the probability (P-) values of the test for the over-identifying re-
strictions that were imposed in estimating the structural parameters. According to this
test, none of the four contracting speciﬁcations is rejected by the data. However, the RW
speciﬁcation implies a higher P-value than the NW speciﬁcation.
We conducted a battery of sensitivity studies. First, we checked wether the results
change if we use the VAR(2) model as approximating probability model. In this case, both,
the RW-C and the RW-S speciﬁcation can be rejected at convenient conﬁdence levels, but
20In estimation we use steady-state values as initial conditions. We drop several years of data from the
simulations so as to avoid an estimation bias due to these initial conditions.
15Table 2: Estimates of the Staggered Contracts Models for the Euro Area
Relative Real Wage Contracts Nominal Wage
RW RW-C RW-S Contracts (NW)
B. VAR(3):
s .1276 .1372 .0742 .0456
(.0401) (.0129) (.0245) (.0465)
γ .0022 .0046 .0212 .0115
(.0011) (.0008) (.0048) (.0053)
σ x .0003 .0012 .0024 .0038
(.0001) (.0002) (.0003) (.0005)
P(Z >z) .7993[4] .3326[4] .2602[4] .3186[4]
Notes:
a Estimated standard errors in parantheses.
b Estimate at the boundary of the parameter space.
c Probability value of the test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying restrictions in
brackets.
not the RW or the NW speciﬁcation, and the NW speciﬁcation entails the highest P-value.
Secondly, we investigated whether our ﬁndings are robust to using an exponential rather
than linear trend in constructing inﬂation deviations. We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient estimates
based on inﬂation deviations from the exponential trend are with one exception within one
standard error bounds of the estimates based on the linear trend. Based on the VAR(3)
the RW speciﬁcation implies a higher P-value than the NW speciﬁcation whether we use
inﬂation deviations from a linear or an exponential trend. Thirdly, we investigated whether
de-trending the inﬂation series may have introduced a signiﬁcant error in our estimation.21
For further details regarding these sensitivity studies the reader is referred to Coenen and
Wieland (2000).
To provide further insight regarding these estimation results, we compare the autocor-
relation functions implied by the constrained VAR(3) representation of each of the four
21To this end we conducted a Monte Carlo study comparing the small-sample properties of the indirect
estimation procedure when the downward trend is anticipated by wage and price setters and when it comes
as a surprise. However, the outcome of the Monte Carlo study shows that the resulting error in estimation
is rather small.
16Figure 3: Estimated Autocorrelations of the Constrained VAR(3) Models for the Euro Area
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Notes:
Solid line with bold dots: RW model.
Dash-dotted line: RW-C model.
Solid line: RW-S model.
Dashed line: NW model.
Dotted lines: Autocorrelations of the unconstrained VAR(3) model plus/minus twice their estimated
asymptotic standard errors.
contracting models with the autocorrelation functions from the unconstrained VAR. As
shown in Figure 3, the autocorrelation functions for all four models tend to remain inside
the 95% conﬁdence bands (dotted lines) associated with the autocorrelation functions of
the unconstrained VAR. The three relative real wage contracting speciﬁcations (RW: solid
line with bold dots, RW-C: dash-dotted line, RW-S: solid line) are rather similar. They
exhibit substantial inﬂation persistence and quite pronounced cross correlations that are
17indicative of a short-run Phillips curve tradeoﬀ. The second panel (top right) indicates
that high levels of output are followed by high inﬂation, while the third panel (bottom left)
shows that high levels of inﬂation are followed by low levels of output. The only noticeable
diﬀerence to the unconstrained VAR is that the latter set of cross correlations are somewhat
larger in absolute magnitude for the constrained VAR. The autocorrelations for the nominal
contracting model (NW: dashed line) indicate a lower degree of inﬂation persistence and less
pronounced cross correlations than for the diﬀerent relative real wage contracting models.
We conclude that our ﬁndings for the euro area diﬀer quite a bit from the results
in Fuhrer and Moore (1995a), who reject the nominal wage contracting model for U.S.
data and ﬁnd that the RW-S speciﬁcation ﬁts U.S. inﬂation dynamics better than the
theoretically more plausible RW speciﬁcation.
Estimates for France, Germany and Italy
To investigate the validity of our results with respect to aggregation across euro area mem-
ber economies, we estimate the diﬀerent contracting models for France, Germany and Italy
separately. The results based on VAR(3) models are summarized in Table 3. For France we
reject the RW-C and the RW-S speciﬁcations, but not the RW and the NW speciﬁcation.
The NW model exhibits the highest P-value. However, in this case the parameter mea-
suring the sensitivity to aggregate demand, γ, is statistically insigniﬁcant. The parameter
estimates for the RW speciﬁcation are signiﬁcant and relatively close to the values obtained
for the euro area. For Italy, which experienced the most dramatic transition process, the
estimation of the NW model did not converge. Instead, the RW and the RW-C model ﬁt
Italian inﬂation data reasonably well and imply statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimates.
For Germany, where inﬂation exhibited no long-run trend, we ﬁnd that all three relative real
wage contracting models are strongly rejected by the data. While the nominal contracting
model is also rejected, it does ﬁt better in the sense of implying a higher P-value. The
parameter estimates for the NW model with German data are surprisingly close to the NW
estimates obtained with euro area data. For further insight regarding the empirical ﬁt of the
18Table 3: Estimates of the Staggered Contracts Models for France, Germany and Italy
Relative Real Wage Contracts Nominal Wage
VAR(3) RW RW-C RW-S Contracts (NW)
A. France: a
s .1085 0 .0564 .1189
(.0500) ( — )b (.0230) (.0370)
γ .0036 .0108 .0296 .0041
(.0020) (.0000) (.0066) (.0041)
σ x .0004 .0052 .0046 .0048
(.0001) (.0000) (.0005) (.0010)
P(Z >z)c .1156[4] .0073[4] .0002[4] .5435[4]
B. Germany:
s .0487 .0376 0 .0501
(.0209) (.0195) ( — ) (.0296)
γ .0061 .0084 .0273 .0195
(.0017) (.0013) (.0064) (.0057)
σ x .0008 .0054 .0063 .0074
(.0001) (.0007) (.0003) (.0007)
P(Z >z) < 10−5 [4] .0001[4] < 10−7 [4] .0026[4]
C. Italy:
s 1/6 .1244 .0970 n.c.d
( — ) (.0111) (.0162)
γ .0006 .0046 .0141 n.c.
(.0003) (.0010) (.0043)
σ x .0002 .0023 .0038 n.c.
(.0000) (.0003) (.0005)
P(Z >z) .1575[4] .1574[4] .0709[4]
Notes:
a Estimated standard errors in parantheses.
b Estimate at the boundary of the parameter space.
c Probability value of the test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying restrictions in
brackets.
d No convergence.
19diﬀerent speciﬁcations from a comparison the autocorrelation functions of the constrained
and unconstrained VAR models the reader is again referred to Coenen and Wieland (2000).
We conclude that, both, the RW and the NW speciﬁcations are plausible alternatives for
the euro area. On the one hand, the estimation with aggregated euro area data indicates a
slight preference for the relative wage contracting model. On the other hand, the comparison
between France, Germany and Italy suggests that this preference may partly be due to the
initial high-inﬂation regime in countries such as Italy and France and the fact that the
subsequent disinﬂation was not fully anticipated. Thus, an optimist would conclude that
the independent European Central Bank will likely face a similar environment in the future
as the Bundesbank did in Germany or possibly the French central bank in the latter part
of the EMS (the “Franc fort” period). In this case, the inﬂation-output relationship for the
euro area would be best characterized by the nominal contracting speciﬁcation. A skeptic,
who suspects that stabilizing euro area inﬂation will require higher output losses, would
instead prefer to use the RW speciﬁcation for the euro area. A robust monetary policy
strategy, however, should perform reasonably well under both speciﬁcations.
5 Closing the model: Output gaps and monetary policy
It remains to specify the determination of aggregate demand and the transmission of mone-
tary policy. Equation (M-6) in Table 4 relates the output gap qt in a simple IS equation to
two lags of itself and to the lagged long-term ex-ante real interest rate, rl
t−1. The demand
shock  d,t in equation (M-6), which is assumed to be serially uncorrelated with mean zero
and unit variance, is scaled with the parameter σ d. The rationale for including lags of
output is to account for habit persistence in consumption as well as adjustment costs and
accelerator eﬀects in investment. We use the lagged instead of the contemporaneous value
of the real interest rate to allow for a transmission lag of monetary policy.22
Next we turn to the ﬁnancial sector and relate the long-term real interest rate to the
22For now we neglect the possibility of eﬀects of the real exchange rate. Fuhrer and Moore (1995b) found
that a similar aggregate demand speciﬁcation ﬁts U.S. output dynamics quite well. Since the euro area
is a large, relatively closed economy just like the United States, the exchange rate is likely to play a less
important role than it did in the individual member economies prior to EMU.
20Table 4: Aggregate Demand and Interest Rates
(M-6) Aggregate Demand qt = δ0 + δ1 qt−1 + δ2 qt−2 + δ3 rl
t−1 + σ d  d,t
(M-7) Policy Rule is
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short-term nominal interest rate, which is the principal instrument of monetary policy.
Three equations determine the various interest rates. The short-term nominal interest rate,
is
t, is set according to a Taylor-type interest rate rule as deﬁned by equation (M-7) in Table
4. According to this rule policymakers change the nominal interest rate in response to
inﬂation deviations from the target π∗ and output deviations from potential. The inﬂation
measure is the year-on-year change in the aggregate price level and the interest rate is
annualized. Furthermore, the real equilibrium rate r∗ provides a reference point for the
policy rule. As shown in Taylor (1993b), a rule with values of 0.5 for the two response
parameters (απ,α q) and 2 percent for π∗ and r∗ ﬁts U.S. federal funds rate behavior from
1987 to 1992 quite well. More recently, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) have shown that
average interest rates in the EMU countries in 1990-98, with the exception of the period
of exchange market turmoil in 1992-93, moved very closely with average output gaps and
inﬂation as implied by Taylor’s rule.23 As to the term structure that is deﬁned in (M-8),
we rely on the accumulated forecasts of the short rate over two years which, under the
expectations hypothesis, will coincide with the long rate forecast for this horizon. The term
23Of related interest, work by Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (1998) suggests that German interest rate policy
since 1979 is summarized quite well by an interest rate rule that responds to a forecast of inﬂation and
the current output gap and exhibits some degree of partial adjustment. Clarida et al. (1998) also argue
that German monetary policy had a strong inﬂuence on interest rate policy in the U.K., France and Italy
throughout this period and may have led to higher interest rates in those countries than warranted by
domestic conditions at the time of the EMS crisis as suggested in Wieland (1996).
21premium is assumed to be constant and equal to zero. We then obtain the ex-ante long-term
real interest rate (deﬁned in M-9) by subtracting inﬂation expectations over the following
8 quarters.
In the deterministic steady state of this model the output gap is zero and the long-
term real interest rate equals its equilibrium value, r∗. This value is a function of the
aggregate demand parameters, r∗ = −δ0/δ3. Since the overlapping contracts speciﬁcations
of the wage-price block do not impose any restriction on the steady-state inﬂation rate, it
is determined by monetary policy alone and equals the target rate, π∗, in the policy rule.
To estimate the parameters of the aggregate demand equation (M-6) we ﬁrst construct
the ex-post long-term real rate by replacing expected future with realized values in equations
(M-8) and (M-9). Then we estimate the parameters by means of Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) using lagged values of output, inﬂation and interest rates as instruments.
The estimation results are reported in Table 5. The sample period for this estimation is
1974:Q4 to 1997:Q1.
Panel A refers to the estimates for the euro area. In the ﬁrst row, the interest rate
data are area-wide GDP-PPP-weighted averages of national money market rates. The
coeﬃcients on the two lags of the output gap are signiﬁcant and exhibit an accelerator
pattern. The interest rate sensitivity of aggregate demand has the expected negative sign,
however the parameter estimate is only borderline signiﬁcant and rather small. It is not
clear however, what is the appropriate real interest rate measure for the euro area. For
example, instead of GDP weights it may be more appropriate to use the relative weights
in debt ﬁnancing for aggregating national nominal interest rates. Or, one could make
the argument that the relevant real rate for the euro area is the German one. After all,
movements in German interest rates presumably had to be mirrored eventually by the
other countries to the extent that they intended to maintain exchange rate parities within
the EMS. For this reason we also use the German real interest rate to estimate the interest
rate sensitivity of euro area aggregate demand. In this case, as shown in the second row,
we ﬁnd similar coeﬃcients on the lags of the output gap, but the estimate of the interest
22Table 5: Estimates of the IS Curve for the Euro Area, France, Germany and Italy
δ0 δ1 δ2 δ3 σ d P(J >j)b
A. Euro Area:a
A.1 area-wide rate: 0.0012 1.2347 -0.2737 -0.0364 0.0056 0.1209[5]
(0.0007) (0.0916) (0.1004) (0.0224)
A.2 German rate: 0.0027 1.1807 -0.2045 -0.0947 0.0057 0.2307[5]
(0.0012) (0.1006) (0.1065) (0.0333)
B. France: 0.0024 1.2247 -0.2708 -0.0638 0.0060 0.1977[5]
(0.0008) (0.1275) (0.1284) (0.0234)
C. Germany: 0.0012 0.7865 0.1395 -0.0365 0.0112 0.2518[5]
(0.0027) (0.0686) (0.0825) (0.0874)
D. Italy: 0.0023 1.3524 -0.3852 -0.0544 0.0063 0.4210[5]
(0.0009) (0.0845) (0.0804) (0.0236)
Notes:
a GMM estimates using a vector of ones and lagged values of the output gap (qt−1,q t−2), the
quarterly inﬂation rate (πt−1,π t−2,π t−3), and the short–term nominal interest rate (i
s
t−1,i
s
t−2,i
s
t−3)a s
instruments. The weighting matrix is estimated by means of the Newey-West (1987) estimator with the
lag truncation parameter set equal to 7. Estimated standard errors in parantheses.
b Probability value of
the J-test of overidentifying restrictions. Number of overidentifying restrictions in brackets.
rate sensitivity is highly signiﬁcant and about three times as large.24 For comparison,
we have also estimated the same speciﬁcation for France, Germany and Italy. In each
case we use the domestic real interest rate. For France and Italy we obtain qualitatively
similar estimates as for the euro area. For Germany however, the estimate of the interest
rate sensitivity is not signiﬁcant and the lags of output do not exhibit an accelerator-type
pattern.
Dynamic Simulations
In the remainder of this section we use dynamic simulations to illustrate the implications
24We have subjected this speciﬁcation of aggregate demand to a battery of sensitivity tests. For example,
we have investigated alternative speciﬁcations of potential output, alternative horizons on the term structure
equation, including the use of average long-term rates instead of a term structure based on short-term rates
and we have varied the length of the sample period. At least qualitatively, the estimation results remain the
same.
23of the alternative wage contracting models for the inﬂation-output variability tradeoﬀ faced
by policymakers. To this end, we consider two diﬀerent scenarios: an unexpected shock to
the contract wage equation (a cost-push shock) and an unanticipated, credible disinﬂation.
In both cases the coeﬃcients in the policy rule are set equal to the value of 0.5 proposed
in Taylor (1993b) that according to Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) coincides surprisingly
well with average interest rate movements in the euro area throughout the 1990s. We
compare the simulation outcomes under the RW, RW-S, RW-C and NW speciﬁcations of
the staggered contracts model using the euro area estimates reported in Table 2. For euro
area aggregate demand we use the estimates obtained with the German real interest rate
as reported in the second row of Table 5.
We start with an unexpected shock to the contract wage equation, a short-run cost-push
shock. Its eﬀects on inﬂation and output under the four diﬀerent contracting speciﬁcations
are shown respectively in the top-left and bottom-left panel of Figure 4. The solid line
with bold dots refers to the RW speciﬁcation, which we found to have the best ﬁt with euro
area data. The RW-S and RW-C speciﬁcations correspond to the solid and dashed-dotted
lines respectively. The response for the NW model is shown by the dashed line.
The shock occurs in the ﬁrst quarter of the second year (period 5). As a result of
this shock inﬂation increases over the next four quarters by almost a full percentage point.
Monetary policy following Taylor’s rule responds to this increase in inﬂation by raising
short-term nominal interest rates suﬃciently to drive up the long-term real interest rate.
This policy tightening induces a slowdown in aggregate demand for about four years. Since
future aggregate demand aﬀects contract wages and through this channel the inﬂation rate,
inﬂation returns to target after little more than two years, even undershooting for a few
periods thereafter. The quantitative consequences of the contract wage shock are quite
similar under the RW, RW-C and RW-S speciﬁcation. In each case, policymakers face a
substantive cost of stabilizing inﬂation in terms of a small recession. Qualitatively, the
impact on output and inﬂation is the same under the NW speciﬁcation, but it is smaller in
size. Thus, the cost of stabilizing inﬂation in terms of reduced output is noticeably larger
24Figure 4: Dynamic Simulations with the Euro Area Model
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under the relative real wage speciﬁcations.
While the costs of stabilizing inﬂation following an unexpected cost-push shock such
as the contract wage shock above are noticeable and quite similar under the three relative
wage contracting speciﬁcations, the output losses associated with an unanticipated, perfectly
credible disinﬂation turn out to be quite diﬀerent. As shown in the top-right and bottom-
right panels of Figure 4 an unanticipated change in the policymaker’s inﬂation target,
25π∗ from 2 percent to 0 percent only results in signiﬁcant output losses in the case of the
RW-S speciﬁcation preferred by Fuhrer and Moore. Also, inﬂation declines towards the new
target rate much faster under the other contracting speciﬁcations. Clearly, in light of the
discussion in Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) this ﬁnding is somewhat surprising. The reason
for the lower output cost of the disinﬂation under the RW and RW-C setup compared to
the RW-S speciﬁcation is that wage setters negotiate contract wages with respect to the
average price level expected to prevail over the life of the contract. In the RW-S model
contract wages are instead negotiated with respect to the current price level. Thus, wage
setters in the RW and RW-C models incorporate the anticipated disinﬂation more quickly
in their decisions.
6 Conclusion
Contrary to Fuhrer and Moore (1995a), who reject the nominal contracting model for the
United States and ﬁnd strong evidence in favor of the relative contracting model which
induces a higher degree of inﬂation persistence, we ﬁnd that both types of contracting
models ﬁt euro area data reasonably well. The best ﬁtting speciﬁcation is a version of the
relative contracting model, which is theoretically more plausible than the simpliﬁed version
preferred by Fuhrer and Moore. To investigate the validity of our results for the euro
area, we also estimated the contracting models for France, Germany and Italy separately.
Our ﬁndings show that the relative contracting model does quite well in countries which
transitioned out of a high inﬂation regime such as France and Italy, while only the nominal
contracting model has a shot a ﬁtting German data. One interpretation of these ﬁndings
is that nominal rigidities in wage and price setting are more pronounced in Italy than in
Germany. If so, one might expect that the euro area will also be characterized by a higher
degree of nominal rigidity than Germany as suggested by our estimates based on euro area
averages. Another interpretation would attribute the higher degree of inﬂation persistence
in euro area, French and Italian data to expectations about imperfectly credible monetary
policy and less than fully credible disinﬂation. In this case, the better ﬁt of the relative
26wage contracting speciﬁcation would be misleading. And consequently, the nominal wage
contracting model may be viewed as a more accurate description of nominal rigidities in
the euro area in the future. Dynamic simulations of the complete model’s response to
an unexpected cost-push shock indicate that stabilizing inﬂation in response to shocks is
less costly under the nominal contracting model, and quite similar under the three relative
real wage contracting models. More surprisingly, however, the only speciﬁcation which
implies substantive output costs of an unanticipated disinﬂation is the simpliﬁed relative-
wage contracting model preferred by Fuhrer and Moore (1995a).
Comparing our results for the euro area with Fuhrer and Moore’s estimates for the
United States with maximum likelihood methods, the question arises whether the diﬀerences
are due to the diﬀerent estimation methodology or the data. Preliminary results based on
the indirect inference methodology of this paper conﬁrm Fuhrer and Moore’s ﬁndings for
U.S. data.25 As in Fuhrer and Moore (1995a) the nominal contracting model tends to be
rejected, while the RW-S speciﬁcation obtains the best ﬁt. However, along the lines of
our discussion of Germany, France and Italy, we emphasize two alternative interpretations
of this ﬁnding. On the one side this ﬁnding may represent evidence of more pronounced
structural rigidities, but on the other side it may just pick up historical inﬂation persistence
that was due to imperfect credibility of monetary policy.
As to future research two issues are of particular interest. First, in terms of evaluating
policy rules for the euro area, it would be particularly important to identify robust rules
that perform reasonably well under diﬀerent types of nominal rigidities. Secondly, with
regard to model estimation it would be of interest to explain the historical disinﬂation
process in France, Italy and in the euro area as a whole within the model. One approach
would be to incorporate a time-varying, imperfectly credible inﬂation target in the
analysis. The moving target could capture the downward trend in inﬂation while market
participants’ beliefs regarding the target would constitute a source of inﬂation persistence.
An alternative approach would be to consider changes in the inﬂation response of the
25These results form part of our ongoing eﬀort to estimate a multi-country model with nominal rigidities
due to overlapping contracts for the major industrial economies, the United States, Japan and the euro area.
27policy rule as the source of inﬂation and disinﬂation. For example, a negative value of
απ in equation (M-7) would result in multiple equilibria with potentially self-fulﬁlling
expectations. Thus, one could explore empirically whether a shift from negative to positive
values of this parameter in France and Italy could explain the downward trend in euro area
inﬂation over the 1980s and 1990s.26
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